Chapter 400: Chapter 87, False and True, Real and Fake Truly
After careful consideration, the London Government made the decision to blockade the Baltic Sea. In fact, the voices opposing the blockade in Parliament had disappeared after the Berlin Government agreed to take over the orders Russians had placed in the United Kingdom.

Anti-Russian policy had always been a strategy for the British, and naturally, no one opposed the idea of hampering the Russians as long as it did not damage everyone’s interests.

On January 11, 1866, the Royal Navy blocked the entrance to the Baltic Sea under the pretext of eradicating pirates.

There was no actual blockade of the Baltic Sea; it was just that, considering the safety of passing ships, the Royal Navy advised everyone to temporarily refrain from entering or leaving the Baltic Sea.

The recommendation was given; it was entirely voluntary whether to heed it or not. Should anyone be robbed by pirates, they would have no cause for regret.

The threat of “pirates” was frightening, and after two Russian merchant ships suffered misfortune, everyone wisely chose to suspend this maritime trade route.

The UK Foreign Office was soon piled high with protests from various countries. Foreign Minister Sir Reslin ordered a cold reception to these protests, and that was that.

The continuation of the Prusso-Russian War was in the interest of France and Austria. Without a major power stepping forward, all smaller nations could do was protest.

In Franz’s view, fueling tactics were the most exhausting way to deplete national strength. The Russian Empire’s inability to leverage its military advantage to completely crush Prussia was already a strategic failure.

Politicians see issues differently than ordinary people do; winning a war does not necessarily equate to victory, and losing a war does not necessarily mean defeat.

There are too many classic cases in history where, to the common observer, a protagonist seemed adrift or stumbled, yet a closer analysis of the gains and losses reveals that the eventual victor is often the one who initially lost.

However, in modern times, as the populace became more politicized and demanded more of the ruling classes, the cost of such maneuvers gradually increased until they were eventually abandoned.

The most immediate benefit of the British blockade was that trade between Russia and Austria increased once again. Now, the Tsarist Government had no choice; this was the only seller available.

Franz did not care how much the prices had increased; the Tsarist Government was placing direct orders with capitalists anyway, and whatever price was negotiated was the price to be paid.

Now that the Tsarist Government was wealthy, the bureaucrats would find ways to spend the money. As the prices of goods rose, the profits of capitalists followed, and the bureaucrats’ kickbacks increased, as did the tax revenue of the Vienna Government.

It was a win-win-win situation: good for you, good for me, good for everyone.

Tyren, the chief of intelligence, handed over a document and said, “Your Majesty, this is the latest European strategy from the French.”

Although he did not secure a victory in the Crimean War, Napoleon III was still very enlightened; he always sought collective wisdom when formulating strategies.

The advantage of collective wisdom was that it decreased the chances of mistakes, but it also increased the chances of exposure. Once many people knew anything, it could no longer be a secret.

Although this French strategic plan was not widely known, there were dozens of people involved in its creation, so it is not surprising that it leaked.

Of course, it could also be that the French deliberately released false information. Nearly every country has a dozen or so plans mixing truth and deceit.

Before an event occurs, no one can be sure which plan is real; one can only collect as much information as possible and then make a judgement.

Even Napoleon III himself could not guarantee which plan would be their real strategy in the future.

Usually, there are several contingency plans, and the most appropriate strategy for the current international situation is selected accordingly.

Such selections can change at any time, unless they are part of a long-term national policy, which is less likely to change; any other strategy is just one of many possible options.

After a careful review, Franz had to admit that the French were ambitious.

They intended to use the Prusso-Russian War to pull the Russians down from their position as world leaders while also plotting to take over the Prussian Rhineland region.

This was just the first step in their strategy, which was to be followed by the annexation of Belgium, the territories west of the Rhine in the German Federation, and even the incorporation of the Italian Area.

In his heart, Franz had already crossed out this grand strategic plan. Such a strategy was fanciful at best, possibly feasible in the Napoleonic Era.

Apart from using the Prusso-Russian War to bring down Russia from its dominant position in Europe, the rest of the strategies were unenforceable.

“Russian French Austrian” partitioning of Prussia was a fallacy from the start.

The Tsarist Government had invested so much in the war that it wouldn’t be able to recoup the costs, even just for Prussian Poland. Would Alexander II feel balanced if the French got the biggest piece of the pie?

Even if he were broad-minded, funding the enemy was not something to be done! Dividing spoils was never a simple task, especially when sharing them with an enemy.

If the French obtained the Rhineland region, their industrial development potential would at least double, whereas for the Russian Empire, gaining Prussian Poland would be a mere consolation, hardly increasing its strength at all.

Not to mention Austria, for whom the benefits of partitioning Prussia were outright negative. Given the choice, Franz would rather go to war with France than accept such a disastrous partitioning condition.

From a profit perspective: a mere tens of thousands of square kilometers of territory would plunge Austria into a strategic dead end. The value brought by this territory was less than the increased national defense spending it would cause.

Politically: Joining the partitioning of Prussia would mean Franz renouncing his status as the head of the Germanic peoples, and the legitimacy of his position as Emperor of the New Holy Roman Empire would be severely challenged.

This was different from the original German Empire, which never had the title of head of the Germanic peoples. Therefore, Wilhelm I did not become Emperor of Germany but had to settle for the title of German Emperor.

Legally, the German Empire was essentially a Republic, with the Emperor being a hereditary president. Even though Wilhelm I obtained the title of Emperor through the Emperor’s Declaration, his actual status remained that of the Chairman of The Federation.

This was also a main reason for the failure of World War I and Wilhelm II’s loss of the throne. The Habsburg dynasty struggled somewhat, and if it weren’t for the successive foolish acts of the last Emperor, Carl, they might have kept a few of their crowns.

Legal status is unique; once lost, it cannot be regained. Franz’s position as head of the Germans stemmed from the unification of the Germany Region, but if he were to partition it with other countries, would the people still accept him as their Emperor?

Even for his own interests, Franz would not allow such a situation to occur.

“Transfer the intelligence to the Cabinet and have them arrange for someone to analyze the strategy the French had previously employed to see what the French might be hiding,” Franz ordered.

These disorganized strategies were actually valuable, as no one could guarantee they wouldn’t become a reality.

At the very least, compared to Bismarck’s original unification plans for Germany, the French strategy had a much higher chance of success, and Bismarck’s far-fetched plan did succeed after all.

There were also Cavour’s Italian strategy, Ito Hirobumi’s Japanese strategy—by the odds, those were even less likely to succeed than the French plan.

With so many successful cases, Franz naturally couldn’t afford to take them lightly. After all, with the considerable strength of France, as long as Napoleon III didn’t interfere on the front lines, they would be one of the most powerful empires in the world.

In theory, many of these plans, except for the Rhineland which Austria wouldn’t compromise on, could potentially realize some form of interest exchange.

The mining resources of the Rhineland region were important to the French, but in reality, they were not irreplaceable—Belgium was one of the substitutes.

As long as they could guarantee coal supplies for several decades and with the development of sea transportation and the continuous reduction of shipping costs, importing mined resources from overseas colonies to the mainland would also be within the industrial acceptance range.

Even the French could simply seek an opportunity to preemptively strike, catching Austria off guard and seize the Rhineland region on the battlefield.

Franz never doubted this possibility; the Austrian General Staff had hundreds of combat plans for attacking France, and the number was still increasing. It wouldn’t be strange at all for the French to have similar ideas.